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I. Introduction
The value of the Transnational Principles and Rules-for U.S.
courts and courts in all countries-lies in at least two areas. First, over
time, parts of the Transnational Principles and Rules might be adopted by
courts or legislatures for use in commercial disputes between citizens of
different countries, or might serve as a procedural mechanism for
resolution outside the judicial system by agreement of the parties.
Second, the Transnational Principles and Rules may cause us to
reexamine the foundations of our respective procedural rules with a view
toward considering revisions. Over time, this reexamination may
encourage transnational harmonization of civil procedure.
My perspective is that of a judge and one who has spent several
years in American rule-making-first as a member of the Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules and then as Chairman of the parent committee,
the Supreme Court's Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure.
From this perspective, I would like to comment on U.S. civil procedure
and the Transnational Principles and Rules, and also to respond to the
excellent papers of my colleagues, Professors Hazard and Taruffo. I will
focus on discovery, expert testimony, and the jury trial, three distinctive
* Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Dana Remus
Irwin provided helpful comments on this draft.
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aspects of our civil procedural system.
II. Discovery
As you know, U.S. discovery allows parties wide latitude in
searching for information and evidence to develop their cases. Together
with notice pleading, broad discovery permits plaintiffs broad access to
the judicial system. There are a few exceptions to the notice pleading
requirement. For example, Federal Rule 9(b) requires claims of fraud to
be pled with particularity. The Private Securities Law Reform Act of
1995 imposes heightened requirements for fact pleadings in securities
fraud actions. But in general, the Federal Rules do not require the fact
pleading that is required by the Transnational Principles and Rules, and
by many countries.
In most cases, discovery is routine and not problematic. Through a
variety of discovery mechanisms-document requests, interrogatories,
witness depositions, requests for admissions and physical
examinations-parties can explore any unprivileged matter that is
relevant to the claim or defense of any party in the case. Unlike in a civil
law system, where the gathering of evidence is viewed as the judge's
task, discovery in our system is party-driven. There is no requirement
for a prior court order. The party seeking discovery simply makes a
request of the other party for responsive documents, for answers to
interrogatories, to depose a witness, and so on. Unless the party
receiving the request has a valid ground for objection, it must respond
with relevant and responsive documents and information. Valid
objections include claims that the request is unfairly burdensome, seeks
material obviously irrelevant, or seeks privileged information. If
disputes arise during discovery, the parties generally attempt to negotiate
a solution. If they cannot reach an agreement, they will rely on informal
or formal judicial resolution. As a trial judge in both state and federal
court, I had small children at home, which provided great training for
resolving disputes among quarrelsome lawyers.
Permissive discovery rules have not always been part of the
American procedural tradition. Prior to adoption of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure in 1938, parties were given little access to evidence in
the hands of an opponent. In conjunction with notice pleading, the new
discovery rules were adopted as a suitable implementation of the
adversary system, offering plaintiffs greater access to the judicial system.
Discovery plays a central role in our procedural system, not only in
allowing parties to develop their positions, but in facilitating pre-trial
resolution in the majority of cases. In the twelve month period leading
up to September 30, 2005, more than 98% of civil cases filed in federal
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courts were terminated before trial. Of these, approximately a quarter
were terminated without any judicial action at all.'
Defendants may file motions to dismiss to challenge legally
insufficient complaints. If these motions are granted, defendants avoid
the costs of discovery and its potential for revealing information
beneficial to the plaintiffs case. In certain cases, a motion to dismiss
may be the focal point, because it disposes of the case without the need
for discovery. The Private Securities Reform Litigation Act specifically
provides that discovery will be stayed until the judge decides a motion to
dismiss. This statutory amendment to the general rule, applicable only in
private securities actions, illustrates how important it can be to
defendants to avoid discovery.
If a motion to dismiss is not granted or was not sought, one or both
parties may file a motion for summary judgment, also a pivotal
procedure in many cases. Unless the dispute is solely a matter of law,
discovery is crucial here, because summary judgment can only be
granted if the judge concludes there is no remaining issue of material fact
to be decided at trial. At any time during a case, parties may engage in
settlement talks. Often, they are encouraged to do so by the judge.
Despite discovery's central place in our procedural system, calls are
often made for reform. Critics contend our discovery rules compromise
other important values, such as efficiency and privacy, and give unfair
advantage to parties with greater resources. Critics also contend parties
overuse discovery requests in order to inflict delay and expense on the
other party. If a party abuses the discovery rules, a judge can impose
sanctions or take other actions. But it is sometimes difficult to
distinguish between discovery that is thorough and aggressive, and
discovery that is unnecessary and abusive. Sometimes, a party's recourse
to another party's excessive discovery requests is to respond in like
manner.
Prior to 2000, the Federal Rules allowed discovery of "any matter,
not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the
pending action."2 Under this standard, it was sufficient for discovery
requests to relate to evidence only incidentally relevant to the issues in
the pleadings, whether or not the evidence could prove or disprove the
claims in question. Defendants complained to the rules committees that
this standard's broad scope allowed plaintiffs to abuse the system by
making broad and onerous document requests that often inflicted
substantial production costs on defendants.
1. See Administrative Office of the United States Courts, 2005 Judicial Business of
the United States Courts, Table C-4, p. 182 (2006).
2. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (1999).
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In response, the Federal Rules were amended in 2000 to limit the
scope of discovery to "any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the
claim or defense of any party."3  The comment to the amendment
explains
[t]he rule change signals to the court that it has the authority to
confine discovery to the claims and defenses asserted in the
pleadings, and signals to the parties that they have no entitlement to
discovery to develop new claims or defenses that are not already
identified in the pleadings.
4
As an exception to the general rule and on a showing of good cause, the
court may allow discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter of
the action.5 The amendments have helped limit abusive discovery
requests by limiting the scope of permissible discovery.
In practice, our discovery is still broader than that contemplated by
the Transnational Principles and Rules. But at least in theory, the basic
standards are similar. Under the Transnational Principles and Rules, a
party is entitled to disclosure of "relevant evidence," defined as
"probative material that supports, contradicts, or weakens a contention of
fact at issue in the proceeding." 6  Unlike the Federal Rules, the
Transnational Principles and Rules do not entitle a party to disclosure of
information that is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence. Some critics of our discovery rules would advocate
a similarly limited scope in our courts.
Other amendments to the Federal Rules in 2000 responded to
complaints by plaintiffs that defendants were overusing and prolonging
depositions in an attempt to drive up plaintiffs' litigation costs. A
provision was added specifying that "[u]nless otherwise authorized by
the court or stipulated by the parties, a deposition is limited to one day of
seven hours."7 The comment further explains that "[t]he presumptive
duration may be extended, or otherwise altered, by agreement. Absent
agreement, a court order is needed. The party seeking a court order to
extend the examination, or otherwise alter the limitations, is expected to
show good cause to justify such an order."8
Another response to discovery abuse has been increased judicial
oversight and control. Particularly in complex cases, it is common for
judges to conduct pretrial conferences to address discovery controversies
3. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (2006).
4. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), Comment to 2000 Amendment.
5. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
6. Transnational Principle 16.1, Comment P- 16A.
7. Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(2) (2006).
8. Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(2), Comment to 2000 Amendment.
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and other issues. This represents a change from the traditional judicial
attitude toward Federal discovery rules, which allowed discovery without
much external restraint. Increased judicial involvement has been an
effective means of addressing discovery disputes and abuses, and has
resulted in increased efficiency. Increased judicial involvement is also
compatible with the Transnational Principles and Rules, which envision
an active role for the judge throughout all aspects of a case.
Two areas of discovery in which U.S. judges are playing
increasingly active roles-international discovery and electronic
discovery-have particular relevance for transnational commercial
litigation. Discovery of evidence abroad can be particularly difficult
when the evidence is located in a country with a more restrictive
approach to discovery. The Hague Convention on Taking of Evidence
Abroad sought to facilitate international discovery by offering various
methods for obtaining information located in foreign countries. All of its
methods are cumbersome and ultimately defer to the procedures of the
county in which the evidence is located.
In 1987, the U.S. Supreme Court severely limited the effectiveness
and relevance of the Hague Convention in U.S. courts by holding it does
not control when its terms unfairly inhibit discovery. 9 Since its terms are
almost always more restrictive than U.S. procedural rules, our judges
often conclude it unfairly inhibits discovery, and then allow for use of
the Federal Rules. This creates friction with foreign countries, foreign
companies, and other foreign entities.
Friction can also arise when our discovery rules are invoked for the
benefit of foreign litigants involved in foreign litigation. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1782 allows a U.S. judge to require a person residing or present in the
forum to produce documents or provide testimony for use in litigation in
a foreign or international tribunal. The requirements of this section are
simpler than those of the Hague Convention. Where satisfied, a judge
has broad discretion to grant assistance. The U.S. Supreme Court has
endorsed broad use of this provision, and has specified that the party
seeking the evidence need not show it would be discoverable in the
foreign or international tribunal.10 Accordingly, U.S. judges are granted
broad discretion to facilitate international discovery.
A second area of increasing judicial involvement is electronic
discovery, which is rapidly becoming the focus of discovery in many
trials. Given the volume of data that may be involved, electronic
discovery can be extremely expensive for all parties. Segregating
9. See Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District Court,
482 U.S. 522 (1987).
10. See Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241 (2004).
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relevant and non-privileged information from non-relevant and/or non-
privileged information is difficult, time-consuming, and expensive,
particularly if the requested data must be retrieved from backup tapes,
metadata or legacy data. The producing party generally bears the
expense of complying with a discovery request. But electronic discovery
also poses high costs to the requesting party, who must sort through large
volumes of produced electronic data, information and documents.
One of the most difficult issues posed by electronic discovery
involves the duty to retain and preserve electronic evidence in
anticipation of litigation. Precisely when this duty arises is not clear.
Once a complaint has been filed, a party is on notice and the duty exists.
But the question is raised whether the duty may arise earlier-whether a
party may have a duty to monitor for potential lawsuits and to retain
electronic evidence in situations where it should reasonably anticipate a
lawsuit. In some regulated industries, there is a statutory duty to retain
documents outside of the context of potential or actual litigation. Once
the duty arises, a party must suspend its document destruction policies
and ensure that relevant documents are preserved. It is unclear whether,
and to what extent, a party must also restore potentially relevant data that
is no longer easily accessible.
At the current time, the Federal Rules do not specifically address
electronic discovery. But an amendment, proposed by the rules
committees and recently approved by the Judicial Conference, addresses
the issue. Under amended Rule 26, a party would be required to produce
all relevant accessible data stored on its electronic storage systems, along
with a description by category and location of all relevant but not
reasonably accessible data. Data that is not reasonably accessible would
be presumptively outside the scope of discovery unless the requesting
party could show good cause for discovery-in which case the judge
would weigh the cost of production against the showing of good cause.I
The judge would be able to specify the conditions for discovery,
including "payment by the requesting party of part of all of the
reasonable costs of obtaining information from sources that are not
reasonably accessible."' 12 In addition, amended Rule 37 would specify
that absent "exceptional circumstances," sanctions would not be imposed
for data lost because of the routine, good-faith operation of an electronic
storage system.13 If these amendments are approved by. the Supreme
11. See Report of the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure to the Chief Justice of the United States and Members of the Judicial
Conference of the United States, September 2005, Proposed Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, at 43 (Proposed Rule 26(b)(2)).
12. Id. at 48 (Committee Note to Proposed Rule 26(b)(2)).
13. See id. at 84 (Proposed Rule 37(f)).
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Court, they will take effect in December 2006.
Large multinational companies rely on electronic communications
and electronic storage of documents and data. As a result, electronic
discovery plays a central role in international commercial disputes. The
Transnational Principles and Rules' limited scope of disclosure, and
disallowance of "fishing expeditions," would, if followed, mitigate the
cost problem by limiting the need to restore data that is no longer easily
accessible. But questions would remain as to the timing, nature and
extent of a duty to retain electronic records.
III. Expert Testimony
Under the Federal Rules, the parties have substantial control over
the use and selection of expert witnesses. While it is not uncommon for
this to lead to "a battle of the experts," the Supreme Court has tightened
the applicable rules, and provided for increased judicial involvement in
managing expert testimony. The Federal Rules have been amended to
codify these changes.
Prior to the early 1990s, admissibility of scientific evidence was
premised on whether the evidence derived from scientific knowledge that
was "generally accepted" in the relevant scientific community. In
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the Supreme Court
rejected this test and held that Federal Rule of Evidence 702-the rule
that allows for expert testimony-requires judges to determine
admissibility based on (1) whether the subject of the expert testimony is
scientific knowledge grounded in the methods and procedures of science
(in other words, if the testimony is reliable) and (2) whether the
testimony will assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or
determining an issue in the case (in other words, if the testimony is
relevant). 14 In Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, the Supreme Court
clarified that trial judges must evaluate the reliability and relevance of all
expert testimony in determining admissibility, and not just scientific
testimony. 15 Together, Daubert and Kumho require the trial judge to
serve as the "gatekeeper" who must assess the reliability and relevance
of all expert testimony offered pursuant to Rule 702.
In 2000, the Federal Rules were amended to codify the Supreme
Court's decisions. Rule 702 now provides expert testimony is admissible
"if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the
witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the
14. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
15. See Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
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case."' 16 The comment to the amendment reiterates that the amendment's
purpose is to ensure the reliability of all forms of expert testimony
admitted at trial. 17 Rules 701 and 703 were amended in conjunction with
Rule 702. Rule 701 now provides that opinions and inferences of lay
witnesses may not be based on scientific, technical or other specialized
knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.18 The comment explains that
the purpose of the amendment is to ensure the gatekeeping requirements
of 702 are not evaded by "proffering an expert in lay witness clothing."' 9
Rule 703 clarifies the limited circumstances under which inadmissible
evidence, relied on by an expert witness in forming an expert opinion,
can be disclosed to a jury to assist the jury in evaluating the expert's
20
opinion.
Judicial involvement in expert testimony has always been an
integral part of case management, but judges are now charged with
increased rigor and scrutiny in addressing issues raised by the use of
expert witnesses. Starting at a pre-trial conference, a judge is involved in
exploring the need for, and possible limitations on, expert testimony. A
judge can also appoint an expert pursuant to Rule 706, which provides:
"[t]he court may appoint any expert witnesses agreed upon by the parties,
and may appoint expert witnesses of its own selection.",
2 1
The Federal Rules start with the premise of party-appointed experts,
but allow for court-appointed experts. The Transnational Principles and
Rules provide for the opposite. Transnational Rule 26.1 provides that
"[t]he court must appoint a neutral expert or panel of experts when
required by law and may do so when it considers that expert evidence
may be helpful." Transnational Rule 26.3 provides "[a] party may
designate an expert or panel of experts on any issue. An expert so
designated is governed by the same standards of objectivity and
neutrality as a court-appointed expert."
The comment to the applicable Transnational Rule begins by stating
"[t]hese Rules adopt the civil-law rule and provisions of the modem
English procedure according to which the court appoints a neutral expert
or panel of experts. 22  But after acknowledging that experts are
generally appointed on the same basis as other witnesses in common-law
systems, the comment states "[t]his Rule adopts an intermediate position.
The court may appoint experts but the parties may also present experts
16. Fed. R. Evid. 702 (2006).
17. See Fed. R. Evid. 702, Comment to 2000 Amendment.
18. See Fed. R. Evid. 701 (2006).
19. Fed. R. Evid. 701, Comment to 2000 Amendment.
20. See Fed. R. Evid. 703 (2006).
21. Fed. R. Evid. 706 (2006).
22. Transnational Rule 26, Comment R-26A.
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whether or not the court has done so. ''23 The Federal Rules and the
Transnational Rules may not be as far apart on this issue as some may
think, since they both allow for both forms of expert testimony. Specific
implementation of the Transnational Rules could result in a system
similar to ours, which relies heavily on party-appointed experts, or
similar to a civil law system, which relies heavily on court-appointed
experts.
IV. Civil Jury Trial
In actions at law-usually, suits seeking money damages-a jury
trial is generally a matter of constitutional right in both in federal and
state courts. But many commentators have noted "the decline of the jury
trial" or "the vanishing jury trial," as most civil cases do not reach trial.
Scholars and commentators have cited several reasons for this, some of
which were touched upon in the discussion of discovery. For example,
the costs of discovery encourage many parties to settle prior to trial. And
many cases are disposed of on motions to dismiss or for summary
judgment.
Another significant factor decreasing the number of jury trials is
risk aversion on the part of the parties. Will the jury's verdict be based
on something other than careful consideration of the evidence? Will the
case be resolved in an unpredictable way? A perennial question is
whether, and to what extent, jurors are influenced by external factors,
such as socio-economic, racial, and religious backgrounds and beliefs.
Jury nullification in varying degrees occurs when a jury bases its verdict
on these or other external factors, and ignores the judge's instructions on
the applicable law governing the case. While traditionally associated
with criminal trials, jury nullification can occur in civil trials as well.
Experienced judges can provide an effective check on jury nullification
through detailed and understandable jury instructions.
Our system also allows means to evaluate whether or not a jury
verdict is justified by a rational evaluation of the evidence. Appellate
courts typically review the "rationality" of jury verdicts in criminal cases
because convicted defendants usually appeal the sufficiency of the
evidence. Of course, there is no appellate review of a criminal jury
acquittal. Although less common, appellate judges are also asked to
review the weight of the evidence supporting a plaintiffs verdict in civil
cases. On a motion for a new trial, trial judges make this assessment as
well. But the burden of proof in civil cases is preponderance of the
evidence, which is less onerous than the beyond a reasonable doubt
23. Transnational Rule 26, Comment R-26D.
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standard of criminal cases, and therefore more difficult to overturn. Jury
interrogatories are usually employed to define the issues, and to
distinguish between the jury's specific findings on various elements of
liability and damages.
Parties also face a risk that in complex cases, for example those
involving intellectual property or antitrust, jurors may have difficulty
understanding the trial evidence. Jurors do well in making credibility
determinations. Are they qualified to evaluate complicated technical
evidence or high-level expert testimony? Traditionally, jurors were
prohibited from taking notes during trial and had to keep track of
evidence through memory alone. In complicated cases, this could
present particular difficulties. Jurors are still prohibited from taking
notes in many state courts, but are permitted to do so in federal court.
Jurors are now more representative of the population at large, and of
a wide spectrum of views, than before. Traditionally, jury service lists
were compiled from property tax roles. Now, names of potential jurors
are drawn from voter registration lists and department of motor vehicle
records. The resulting jury service lists are more broadly inclusive of the
adult population.
Traditionally, it has been the advocates' job to educate the jury, but
many have advocated a more active role for the judge in helping the
jurors understand the issues. Judges could play a role in questioning
witnesses, much like in the inquisitorial tradition, to ensure jurors hear
answers to questions that the advocates have not posed, but that may be
helpful in understanding the case. A judge's experience allows him or
her to receive and consider evidence differently than would a lay juror.
A judge will typically focus on the dispositive issues, and will demand
answers to disputed questions. This means that an advocate's
presentation of evidence to a judge need not be as methodical as to a
jury. It also means that a judge can play an important role in helping the
jury to understand the evidence and issues involved in a case. Such a
role is not required by the Transnational Principles and Rules, which
provide that questioning witnesses and eliciting testimony should
proceed as is customary in the forum, but would certainly be compatible
with them.
It is interesting to consider the difference between verdicts reached
in jury trials and determinations that would be made by a judge
addressing the same evidence. Anecdotally, most judges I know think
juries in criminal cases, where credibility determinations are often key,
do an excellent job in deciding questions of guilt or innocence. Judges
are less satisfied with civil juries, partly because of the difficulty in
comprehending complex cases and partly because of variances in finding
liability and in damage awards. One significant difference between a
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judge's decision and a jury verdict is the detailed and reasoned
explanation that a federal judge will provide when deciding cases
without a jury. A trial judge's "findings of fact and conclusions of law"
provide reasoned decisions that meet the standard of what is expected in
civil law systems. Appellate review is deferential to the judges' factual
findings (clearly erroneous) but plenary with respect to issues of law.
Another risk the parties face involves jury selection. Jury selection
procedures vary. Typically, prospective jurors with obvious conflicts of
interest are excused, and the remaining jurors are asked various questions
about themselves in a process we refer to as voir dire. Responses that
indicate possible prejudice are the basis for challenges for cause. In
federal court, judges conduct voir dire questioning. In most state courts,
advocates do. Each party then has a limited number of peremptory
challenges-three in federal cases-which may be used for any reason
other than to exclude a juror on the basis of race or ethnicity. The trial
jury consists of those who are not disqualified by challenges for cause or
peremptory challenges.
In theory, the jury selection process protects against jurors who are
biased or who have a predetermined view of a case. In reality, each party
wants a jury favorable to its case or at a minimum, a jury that is
impartial, and wants to use voir dire and peremptory challenges to
exclude jurors it perceives to be unfavorable. Some experienced
advocates consider jury selection to be the most important aspect of
trying a jury case. For this reason, in important cases, parties with
substantial resources employ jury consultants to aid in juror selection and
run mock trials before surrogate jurors to "try out" their case.
It is the judge who desires an impartial jury. In jury selection and in
the entire conduct of the trial, the judge endeavors to ensure that the
proceeding is geared not only toward resolving the parties' dispute, but
doing so based on a truthful assessment of the evidence. Resolving
disputes and finding truth are not mutually exclusive, and most judges
play a significant role in ensuring that the benefits of the adversarial
system do not come at the expense of justice. As an example, pre-trial
and during the trial, the judge is charged with interpreting the rules of
evidence that are based on concepts of relevance, trustworthiness and
absence of prejudice. By regulating the admissibility of evidence, and
excluding evidence incompatible with a fair trial, the judge ensures that
the proceeding will further the pursuit of justice.
Furthermore, judges are responsible for informing and educating the
jury as to the governing law of the case. They do so through jury
instructions, which explain the legal principles the jurors are to apply to
the evidence. Understandable, balanced jury instructions are crucial to
fair jury verdicts. While the parties can play a role in suggesting and
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formulating jury instructions, it is ultimately a task of the judge.
In bench trials as well, judges play a prominent and independent
role in guiding the proceedings. As a specific example, just as
Transnational Principle 22.2.3 allows a judge to "rely upon.., an
interpretation of the facts or of the evidence that has not been advanced
by a party," so too can our trial judges, when deciding cases without a
jury, rely upon an interpretation of the evidence not offered by the
parties. Also, on appeal, judges may affirm or reverse on grounds not
raised by the parties. Therefore, in determining the most accurate and
fair characterization of the facts and in applying the law, a judge plays an
independent role, and is not bound by the presentations and arguments of
the parties.
V. Conclusion
Whether or not the Transnational Principles and Rules are formally
adopted in various countries, they offer great value. They encourage us
to reevaluate the principles and rules of our respective procedural
systems, and they offer thoroughly considered solutions to problems that
arise in adjudication in general, and transnational commercial suits in
particular.
[Vol. 25:2
